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Abstract.  We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders’ 
equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue.  We also study the incentives of bidders to 
merge given the private information they have.  We develop two models, depending on how 
after-merger valuations are created.  In the first, single-aspect model, the valuation of the 
merged firm is the maximum of the valuations of the two firms engaged in the merger.  In the 
multi-aspect model, a bidder’s valuation is the sum of two components and a merged firm 
chooses the maximum of each component of the two merging firms.  In the first model, a 
merger creates incentives for bidders to shade their bids leading to lower revenue.  In the 
second model, the non-merging firms do not shade their bids and revenue is actually higher.  
In both models, we show that all bidders have an incentive to merge. 
Key Words: Mergers, first-price sealed-bid auctions. 
JEL Classification:  D44, D82. 
 
                                                 
*  We are grateful to Jan Boone, Eric van Damme, Sergei Izmalkov, Paul Klemperer, Sander 
Onderstal, and Charles Thomas, and to audiences at Tilburg University and at EARIE 2012 for helpful 
comments. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Bidding markets become more and more important in many aspects of economic life.  In 
government procurement, auctions are more and more prevalent.  In business-to-business 
markets, auctions or other tender procedures are used increasingly often.  Like in other 
markets, mergers do take place, and an important question, especially for competition 
authorities, is how to evaluate mergers in bidding markets. 
One important class of such mergers occurs in public transport markets in Europe, where 
(local) governments have used public tender procedures to choose a private transportation 
company to provide regional public transportation services.  One popular view on mergers in 
bidding markets is that due to the buyer power of the auctioneer, mergers are not anti-
competitive as long as there remains one serious independent competitor in the market after a 
merger (see, e.g., Lexecon, 1995).  Theoretically, this view seems to be based on the 
traditional Bertrand model with homogeneous goods, where indeed one firms takes and serves 
the market, and the existence of one competitor is enough to create a competitive outcome.  
Klemperer (2006) argues against this view, stating that mergers in bidding markets must be 
evaluated essentially along the same lines as mergers in other markets. 
In this paper, we argue that mergers in bidding markets do warrant a special treatment, 
but that it is certainly not the case that the presence of one serious bidder is sufficient for 
bidding markets to remain as competitive as without the merger.  We consider a standard 
first-price sealed-bid auction (as most bidding markets use this auction format) and ask the 
question whether firms have an incentive to merge and what the effects of a merger are on 
equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. 
We model a merger in the following way.  Without mergers, a bidding market is 
presented as a static first-price sealed-bid auction where bidders have private information 
concerning their valuations.  After knowing his own private valuation, but without knowing 
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the private valuation of the other players, one of the players offers a proposal to merge to 
another player.  Merging implies acting as a single bidder and submitting together one bid in 
the auction.  The bidder receiving the offer to merge, knowing his private valuation, but not 
knowing the private valuation of the bidder that makes the offer, has to decide whether to 
accept the offer or not.  If the offer is not accepted, everyone makes separate bids.  If the offer 
is accepted, all other bidders know a merger has taken place, and that the merged entity has 
access to all the information of both merging bidders.  Note that private information of the 
other merged bidder becomes only available to both merging bidders after the merger is 
accepted and implemented. 
Two modeling issues are important in this set-up.  The first issue is how to model the 
valuation of the merged entity.  The second issue is how to deal with the possibility that the 
process of the merger, i.e., whether to propose a merger and whether to accept it, reveals (a 
part of) private information about the type of the proposing and/or accepting bidders. 
On the first issue, we consider two variations.  In the basic set-up, we assume that the 
valuation of the merged entity is the maximum of the valuation of both merging bidders.  
After accessing private information of both bidders, the merged entity realizes who has the 
highest value and then bids according to this highest value.  In the more advanced set-up, the 
valuation of a bidder is built up from more basic processes within the firm.  In public 
transportation, for instance, a firms’ after-auction profits, which is the valuation in the 
auction, depends on its marketing abilities, the ability to manage the logistic processes, its 
potential to bargain low prices for the coaches or trains it is using, etc.  For simplicity, we 
assume that the bidder’s value is the sum of such partial valuations, which we call aspects and 
model these partial valuations as independent random variables.  Thus, a bidder’s type in this 
advanced set-up is multi-dimensional.  After the merger, the merged entity has access to the 
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best aspects of the merging firms, and chooses to combine the largest partial valuations.1
Concerning the issue whether the actions to propose or accept a merger reveals private 
information, we consider the incentives of different types of bidders to merge.  If all types of 
bidders have an incentive to propose and accept a merger, then these actions do not reveal 
firms’ private information.  This is, obviously, the simplest situation to analyze; otherwise the 
merger proposal and acceptance strategies, along with auction bidding, are to be analyzed as a 
signaling game where both the proposer and the receiver of the proposal needs to take into 
account which types are willing to propose and which types are willing to accept the merger. 
  
Accordingly, the basic set-up is called the single-aspect model, while the advanced set-up is 
called the multi-aspect model.  In the discussion section at the end of the paper, we discuss to 
what extent our multi-aspect model should be regarded as modeling efficiencies in bidding 
markets (in a similar vein to the cost efficiencies introduced by Perry and Porter, 1985, 
building on Williamson, 1968). 
The analysis of mergers in bidding markets requires analyzing asymmetric first-price 
sealed-bid auctions.  Even if the auction is symmetric before a merger, it transforms into an 
asymmetric auction after the merger in both the single aspect and the multi-aspect model.  
The asymmetry arises as after the merger the valuation of the merged entity follows a 
different distribution function than the valuation of the non-merging bidders.  Asymmetric 
first-price sealed-bid auctions are inherently difficult to analyze analytically.  Marshall et al 
(1994) have developed numerical techniques to solve asymmetric first-price auctions, and 
Lebrun (2006) has proved, under fairly general conditions, that an equilibrium exists and is 
unique.  Thus, the analysis in this paper is also largely based on numerical methods.  We do, 
however, prove some results on the effect of mergers by comparing revenues in symmetric 
auctions with four firms with revenues in symmetric auctions with two firms, where the 
                                                                        
1  Note that in most of the auction literature, it is not interesting to consider the composition of a 
bidder’s valuation.  In the end, it is a bidder’s overall valuation that determines his bid.  With mergers, 
this is no longer true because in the multi-aspect model, the valuation of the merged entity can be 
strictly higher than the maximum of the two valuations of the merging bidders. 
 5 
valuations of each of the two bidders are equal to the maximum of the valuations of two of the 
bidders in the four bidder auction.  As the competition issues seem to be mainly relevant 
when the bidding market is already concentrated to begin with, we mainly focus on the case 
where the number of bidders is small. 
In the single-aspect model, we arrive at the following results.  After the merger, there is 
some bid shading, especially by the merged firm, and therefore revenue is lower than without 
a merger.  Moreover, all types have an incentive to merge, and, therefore, the act of proposing 
or accepting a merger is not a signal of a firm’s type.  It also implies there is no merger 
paradox, as in Salant et al (1983).  Note, however, that the reduction in revenue is much 
smaller than what could be expected from just taking one rival bidder out of the market.  Note 
also that despite all types having an incentive to merge, it is the higher valuation types that 
have most incentives to merge and that actually, like in mergers in “normal markets”, it is the 
non-merging firms that benefit the most from the merger. 
These results are fairly standard in any merger analysis and can be explained as follows.  
For a non-merging bidder, the changes caused by the merger are, in a sense, of second-order 
magnitude.  In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the bidding behavior of a player is driven by 
the distribution of the highest bid of its competitors.  Since the valuation of the merged bidder 
is the maximum of the valuations of the two merging firms, the best response bidding strategy 
of non-merging bidders remains unaffected.  On the other hand, facing the same bidding 
strategy of non-merging bidders, the merged entity shades its bid compared to the bids of the 
two merging bidders because it faces one competitor less.  Thus, the overall merger effect on 
the bids of non-merged bidders is based on two effects.  First, due to bid shading of the 
merged bidder, non-merged bidders also bid less.  Second, given that the merged bidder has a 
better (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, FOSD hereinafter) distribution of the 
value than any of the individual bidders, these latter non-merged bidders bid more 
aggressively after the merger. 
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The results in the multi-aspect model are, however, very different.  Our main result here 
is that mergers are often revenue increasing.  Moreover, as in the singe-aspect case, all 
bidders’ types have an incentive to merge.  Finally (and interestingly), it is the merged bidder 
that benefits the most from the merger, not the non-merging firms.  That is, unlike most of the 
merger literature where free-riding is prevalent (see, e.g., Deneckere and Davidson, 1985), 
there is no free-riding of the non-merging firms in this context. 
In order to explain these results, we point at the same two forces as in the single-aspect 
model.  The main difference is that in the multi-aspect case, the merged bidder has a better 
value distribution than it has in the single-aspect case.  This means that, despite the merged 
firm shading his bid, the bid distribution of the merged entity improves (in FOSD sense) so 
that all non-merged firms bid more aggressively than in the single dimension case.  In short, 
in the multi-aspect model mergers are competition and revenue enhancing! 
To the best of our knowledge there are three papers on mergers in bidding markets that 
are directly comparable to ours.2
                                                                        
2  There are three other papers that deserve mentioning.  Using bidders’ values that are drawn from 
Extreme Value distributions, Tschantz et al. (2000) analyze first-price and second-price auctions with 
three bidders.  Thomas (2004) studies bidding markets where firms’ types are drawn from a discrete 
distribution, and derives analytic results for this case.  Our paper and the papers mentioned in the main 
text consider auctions with a continuum of types.  A recent paper by Gössl and Wambach (2012) 
studies dynamic issues in bidding markets and focuses on a setting where bidders’ valuations are 
common knowledge.  Our paper is static in nature, but does consider the private information nature of 
a bidder’s valuation. 
  Waehrer (1999) studies coalitions of bidders in first and 
second price auctions in terms of the average profit a collation member makes.  He 
numerically shows that mergers in first and second-price auctions have different effects in that 
in second-price auctions only the expected profit of the merging firms is affected.  Waehrer 
and Perry (2003) derive analytic results for second-price sealed-bid auctions (as these 
auctions have a weakly dominant bid strategy) and find that mergers are profitable and reduce 
competition.  They also consider how an auctioneer may affect auction outcomes by choosing 
a reserve price.  Dalkir et al (2000) extensively discuss how bidding markets are relevant for 
the evaluation of hospital mergers in the USA where hospitals sell their service to preferred 
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provider organizations (PPOs).  That analysis covers the revenue and bidding aspect of what 
we have termed the single aspect model.  Compared to this literature, we add three points to 
the analysis of mergers in bidding markets.  First, we introduce a methodology to assess a 
bidder’s incentives to merge given his private information.  Second, we analyze the way 
merged bidders can combine different aspects of the merging firm’s valuation.  Third, we 
prove a result on revenues in asymmetric auctions by comparing two carefully constructed 
symmetric auctions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the signal-aspect model, 
analyzes its equilibrium bidding behavior and its revenue consequences, and studies the 
incentive of the bidders to merge.  Section 3 covers the multi-aspect model.  Section 4 
concludes with a discussion.  The appendix contains proofs and elaborates derivations of 
more complicated expressions. 
2. Single-aspect model 
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction where 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁 bidders have private valuations 𝑣𝑖 
which are independently distributed according to a distribution function 𝐹𝑖.  Two out of these 
N firms consider to merge.  After the merger, we denote the merged entity by the superscript 
𝑀 and the other non-merged bidders by the superscript 𝑁.  Lebrun (2006) has demonstrated 
that under fairly general conditions, an equilibrium always exists and is unique in asymmetric 
first-price sealed-bid auctions.  Therefore, we know that both before and after the merger 
equilibrium exists and is unique.  In an equilibrium, bidder 𝑖 bids 𝑏𝑖(𝑣𝑖).  For simplicity, we 
assume that before the merger, individual valuations are uniformly distributed over the 
interval [0,1].  Auction revenue is denoted by 𝑅. 
Before the merger takes place, we have a standard symmetric auction where the 
equilibrium bidding function is given by 𝑏(𝑥) = 𝑁−1
𝑁
𝑥 and revenue equals 
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𝑅 = 𝐸 �𝑁 − 1
𝑁
max
𝑖
[𝑣𝑖]� = 𝑁 − 1𝑁 �𝑥𝑑𝑥𝑁1
0
= 𝑁 − 1
𝑁 + 1. 
Let bidders 1 and 2 merge.  The new bidder 𝑀 is assumed to have a value 𝑣𝑀 = max[𝑣1, 𝑣2].  
The equilibrium bidding functions after a merger are given by: 𝑏𝑀(𝑣𝑀) and 𝑏𝑁(𝑣𝑖), 𝑖 =3, … ,𝑁, where the valuation of the merged bidder does not follow a uniform distribution 
anymore, but instead is given by the distribution of 𝑣𝑀 = max[𝑣1, 𝑣2], which is 𝐹𝑀(𝑥) = 𝑥2. 
Profits for the merged and non-merged firms of type 𝑥, bidding as if their type were 𝑦 
and all others bid according to the equilibrium bidding functions, are now given by 
𝜋𝑀�𝑥, 𝑏𝑀(𝑦)� = �𝑥 − 𝑏𝑀(𝑦)� � Pr[𝑏𝑁(𝑣𝑖) < 𝑏𝑀(𝑦)]
𝑖=3,…,𝑁  
𝜋𝑖
𝑁�𝑥, 𝑏𝑁(𝑦)� = �𝑥 − 𝑏𝑁(𝑦)�Pr[𝑏𝑀(𝑣𝑀) < 𝑏𝑁(𝑦)] � Pr�𝑏𝑁�𝑣𝑗� < 𝑏𝑁(𝑦)�
𝑗=3,…,𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
 
If we write 𝜑𝑀(𝑏) ≡ (𝑏𝑀)−1(𝑏) and 𝜑𝑁(𝑏) ≡ (𝑏𝑁)−1(𝑏) for the inverses of the bidding 
functions, we can simplify the profit functions to the following expressions: 
𝜋𝑀(𝑥, 𝑏) = (𝑥 − 𝑏)�𝜑𝑁(𝑏)�𝑁−2 
𝜋𝑖
𝑁(𝑥, 𝑏) = (𝑥 − 𝑏)�𝜑𝑀(𝑏)�2�𝜑𝑁(𝑏)�𝑁−3 
In equilibrium, both merged and non-merged firms should maximize their profits, giving a 
system of first-order conditions that is analytically intractable: 
⎩
⎨
⎧0 = 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝜕𝑏
(𝜑𝑀, 𝑏) = �(𝑁 − 2)(𝜑𝑀 − 𝑏)𝜑𝑁′ − 𝜑𝑖𝑁� (𝜑𝑁)𝑁−3                                                  0 = 𝜕𝜋𝑖𝑁
𝜕𝑏
(𝜑𝑁(𝑏),𝑏) = 𝜑𝑀(𝜑𝑁)𝑁−4 �(𝜑𝑁 − 𝑏)�2𝜑𝑁𝜑𝑀′ + (𝑁 − 3)𝜑𝑀𝜑𝑁′� − 𝜑𝑀𝜑𝑁�  
For the numerical analysis, we fix the number of bidders to 𝑁 = 4 and compute the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric auction where bidders 1 and 2 merge.  The merged 
entity bids 𝜑𝑀(𝑥) and other bidders 𝑖 = 3,4 bid 𝑏𝑁(𝑣3) and 𝑏𝑁(𝑣4).  Figure 1 represents 
bidding functions 𝑏(𝑥) before, and 𝑏𝑀(𝑥) and 𝑏𝑁(𝑥) after the merger. 
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One can clearly see that the merged bidder shades its bid and then, in reaction, so do the 
non-merging bidders 𝑖 = 3,4, especially for higher valuations.  It is, therefore, not a surprise 
that the auction revenue drops because of the merger from 𝑅 = 0.600 to 𝑅𝑀 = 0.569.  
Bidders’ expected ex ante surpluses before they know their types, are 0.050 before and 0.109 
for the merged bidder and 0.060 for the remaining bidders after the merger.  Thus, like in 
most of the merger literature, the non-merging firms benefit most from the merger, i.e., there 
is a free-riding problem in the sense that everybody wants others to merge. 
We next look into the incentives of different types to merge.  Before the merger takes 
place, bidder 𝑖 = 1 of type 𝑣1 = 𝑥 bids 𝑏1 = 𝑏(𝑥) = 34 𝑥, getting the following surplus:3
                                                                        
3  We use the following common notation here: E[𝐴 ∶ 𝐵] = E[𝐴|𝐵] ∙ Pr[𝐵]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Bidding functions 𝑏(𝑥) before and 𝑏𝑀(𝑥) and 𝑏𝑁(𝑥) after the merger of bidders 
𝑖 = 1,2, for 𝑁 = 4. 
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𝑠1(𝑥) = E𝑣−1[𝑥 − 𝑏1(𝑥) ∶ max[𝑣−1] ≤ 𝑥] = �𝑥 − 𝑏(𝑥)��𝐹(𝑥)�𝑁−1 = 14 𝑥4 
From the prospective of bidder 1, bidder 𝑖 = 2 gets an expected surplus conditional on 𝑥 of 
𝑠2� (𝑥) = E𝑣−1[𝑠2|𝑣1 = 𝑥] = E𝑣−1��𝑣2 − 𝑏2(𝑣2)�|𝑣1 = 𝑥� 
= E𝑣−2 �14 𝑣2 ∶ max{𝑥, 𝑣3, 𝑣4} ≤ 𝑣2� = 14��� 𝑣2𝑑(𝑧2)𝑣2
0
�𝑑𝑣2
1
𝑥
= 116 (1 − 𝑥4). 
Thus, the joint expected profit of bidders 𝑖 = 1,2 before the merger from the perspective of 
type x of bidder 1 is: 
𝑠1+2������(𝑥) ≡ 𝑠1(𝑥) + 𝑠2� (𝑥) = 116 (1 + 3𝑥4). 
To investigate the surplus of the merged bidder conditional on bidder 𝑖 = 1 having type 
𝑥, we first consider the expected surplus conditional on 𝑣𝑀 of the merged bidder 𝑠𝑀(𝑣𝑀): 
𝑠𝑀(𝑣𝑀) = E𝑣𝑖𝑁 ��𝑥 − 𝑏𝑀(𝑥)� ∶ max𝑖=3,4[𝑏𝑁(𝑣𝑖)] ≤ 𝑥� = �𝑥 − 𝑏𝑀(𝑥)� �𝐹 �𝜑𝑖𝑁�𝑏𝑀(𝑥)���2. 
Its expectation conditional on 𝑣1 = 𝑥 is given by 
𝑠𝑀����(𝑥) ≡ E𝑣2[𝑠𝑀(𝑣𝑀)|𝑣1 = 𝑥] = E𝑣2[𝑠𝑀(max[𝑥, 𝑣2])] 
= Pr[𝑣2 < 𝑥] × 𝑠𝑀(𝑥) + E𝑣2[𝑠𝑀(𝑣2) ∶ 𝑣2 > 𝑥] = 𝐹(𝑥)𝑠𝑀(𝑥) + �𝑠𝑀(𝑣2)𝑑𝑣21
𝑥
. 
Using numerically computed bidding functions 𝑏𝑀(𝑥) and 𝑏𝑖𝑁(𝑥), we compute the joint 
expected profit 𝑠𝑀����(𝑥) of bidders 𝑖 = 1,2 after the merger.  Figure 2 represents graphs of 
𝑠1+2������(𝑥) (thing curve), and of 𝑠𝑀����(𝑥) (bold curve). 
As one can see, 𝑠𝑀����(𝑥) > 𝑠1+2������(𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈ [0,1].  This implies that bidder 𝑖 = 1, 
whatever his private valuation 𝑣1 is, always has an incentive to approach any another bidder 
and to propose a merger.  Indeed, by doing so, bidder 𝑖 = 1 increases his joint surplus when 
the proposal is accepted.  Similarly, bidder 𝑖 = 2 always has the same incentive to accept the 
proposal.  Thus, we do not need to worry about potential signaling issues: all types have an 
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incentive to merge.  One can also see that the incentive to merge of higher types are stronger 
than that of low types. 
3. Multi-aspect model 
We now consider the multi-aspect model briefly discussed in the Introduction.  To simplify 
the exposition, we assume two aspects only, i.e., the overall valuation is composed of two 
additive terms.  In particular, let the value of bidder 𝑖 be the sum of two independent random 
variables 𝑣𝑖1 and 𝑣𝑖2, i.e., 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖1 + 𝑣𝑖2.  When bidders 𝑖 = 1,2 merge, the merged entity gets 
the value 𝑣𝑀 = max[𝑣11, 𝑣21] + max[𝑥12, 𝑥22].  That is, the merged bidder chooses the best 
components of each merging bidder, and then adds the two components together to create the 
overall valuation. 
 
Figure 2. Joint expected surplus of bidders 𝑖 = 1,2, before, 𝑠1+2������(𝑥) (thing curve), and after 
the merger, 𝑠𝑀����(𝑥) (bold curve), for 𝑁 = 4. 
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0.2 
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In order to keep valuations 𝑣𝑖 distributed over the interval [0,1], we let the components 
𝑣𝑖
1 and 𝑣𝑖2 be independently and uniformly distributed over the interval �0, 12�.  The density 
and distributions functions of 𝑣𝑖 are therefore no longer uniform, but given by 
𝑓(𝑥) = � 𝑓1(𝑥 − 𝑡)𝑓2(𝑡)𝑑𝑡∞
−∞
= 2 � 𝑓1(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥
𝑥−0.5 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧4�𝑑𝑧𝑥
0
= 4𝑥                 , if  𝑥 ∈ �0, 12�
4 � 𝑑𝑧0.5
𝑥−0.5 = 4(1 − 𝑥), if  𝑥 ∈ �12 , 1�
  
and 
𝐹(𝑥) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�4𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑥
0
= 2𝑥2                                        , if  𝑥 ∈ �0, 12�12 + � 4(1 − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑥
0.5 = 1 − 2(1 − 𝑥)2, if  𝑥 ∈ �12 , 1�
  
We first describe the implications of a merger in this two-aspect valuation model for the 
bidding functions of different bidders.  As before, we are interested in the (symmetric) 
bidding function 𝑏(𝑥) before the merger and the bidding functions 𝑏𝑀(𝑥) for the merged and 
𝑏𝑁(𝑥) for non-merged firms in the asymmetric auction after the merger. 
For the numerical analysis, we compute the Bayes-Nash equilibrium before and after the 
merger.  Figure 3 presents the results for 𝑁 = 4.  One can see that, roughly speaking, the 
same effects arise here as in the single-aspect model, but now with different strengths.  First, 
the merged entity has an incentive to shade its bid (given that it has the same valuation as one 
of the firms before the merger).  The non-merging bidders also want to shade their bids, but 
they know that they now compete with a stronger bidder (with a higher valuation in a FOSD 
sense than the valuation of the pre-merged bidders). 
One can see in the graph that these two effects roughly cancel out in the present case, but 
interestingly, for middle range valuations, the non-merging bidders slightly increase their 
bids, while for higher valuations the bid-shading incentive dominates.  The reason for this 
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property is that it is much more likely that the after-merger value exceeds the maximum of the 
two bidders’ values for the middle range valuations than for the upper range valuations. 
Given these bidding functions, we can now analyze the revenue implications of a merger 
in the two-aspect model when 𝑁 is small.  We can analytically prove that when 𝑁 = 4, at 
least some of the mergers that can arise in such an environment are revenue increasing. 
Proposition 1.  Consider a two-aspect bidding market with 𝑁 = 4 symmetric firms.  If we let 
any pair of firms merge sequentially, then it must be the case that in at least one of these 
mergers the revenue has increased. 
The way Proposition 1 is proven is as follows.  Before and after two sequential mergers, we 
have a symmetric auction with 𝑁 = 4 and 𝑁 = 2 firms, respectively.  Each of these 
symmetric auctions satisfies the conditions of the revenue equivalence theorem, and we, 
 
Figure 3. Bidding functions before and after the merger of bidders 𝑖 = 1,2 for 𝑁 = 4. 
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therefore, can use it to express the revenue in both cases as the expected value of the second-
highest order statistic of bidders’ values.  Comparing revenues before and after the merger 
reveals that the revenue in the auction with 𝑁 = 2 bidders is larger than the revenue with 
𝑁 = 4 bidders.  Then, as this overall change in revenue is the sum of the revenue change 
going first from 𝑁 = 4 to 𝑁 = 3 bidders, and then from 𝑁 = 3 to 𝑁 = 2, it must be that at 
least one of these mergers has resulted in higher revenues.  Thus, we use results of symmetric 
auctions, to prove a result that involves at least one asymmetric auction.’ 
Using numerical methods, we can show that the revenue actually increases in both steps.  
With 𝑁 = 4 bidders, the expected revenue is 𝑅(4) = 0.5637.  When two bidders merge 
resulting in an auction with 𝑁 = 3 bidders, expected revenue increases to 𝑅(3) = 0.5653.  
When the two remaining yet non-merged bidders then subsequently also merge, the auction is 
again symmetric, and the expected revenue is 𝑅(2) = 0.5719.  Thus, each subsequent merger 
increases the expected revenue. 
In a similar way, one can also analyze mergers in bidding markets starting with 𝑁 = 6 
bidders.  The initial expected revenue is 𝑅(6) = 0.6376.  With each subsequent merger, 
eventually leading to 𝑁 = 3 symmetric firms, expected revenues increase to 𝑅(5) = 0.6479, 
𝑅(4) = 0.6602, and, finally, to 𝑅(3) = 0.6738.  Numerical simulations show that expected 
revenue goes up when we move from 𝑁 = 2𝑘 firms to 𝑁 = 𝑘 firms for all even 𝑁 up to at 
least 30.  Similar statements as the one in Proposition 1 can be proven analytically for each 
fixed 𝑁 = 6,8, etc. 
We will investigate, finally, the incentives of bidders to merge.  The joint expected 
surplus 𝑠1+2������(𝑥) of bidders 𝑖 = 1,2 before the merger can be numerically computed in a way 
that is similar to what we have done in the previous section.  That is, from the perspective of 
bidder 𝑖 = 1 with value 𝑣1 = 𝑥, we have the standard surplus for bidder 𝑖 = 1 and an 
expected surplus 𝑠2� (𝑥) of bidder 𝑖 = 2 before the merger conditional on 𝑥.  Note that before 
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the merger, the distribution of valuation over the two different aspects is unimportant as it is 
the overall valuation that determines a player’s bid and his surplus: 
𝑠1(𝑥) = �𝑥 − 𝑏1(𝑥)��𝐹(𝑥)�𝑁−1 
𝑠2� (𝑥) = E𝑣−2��𝑣2 − 𝑏2(𝑣2)� ∶ max{𝑥, 𝑣−2} ≤ 𝑣2� 
= ��𝑣2 − 𝑏2(𝑣2)��𝐹(𝑣2)�𝑁−2𝑑𝐹(𝑣2)1
𝑥
= 1
𝑁 − 1��𝑣2 − 𝑏2(𝑣2)�𝑑�𝐹(𝑣2)�𝑁−11
𝑥
. 
Thus, joint expected surplus 𝑠1+2������(𝑥) ≡ 𝑠1(𝑥) + 𝑠2� (𝑥) is 
𝑠1+2������(𝑥) = �𝑥 − 𝑏1(𝑥)��𝐹(𝑥)�𝑁−1 + 1𝑁 − 1��𝑣2 − 𝑏2(𝑣2)�𝑑�𝐹(𝑣2)�𝑁−1.1
𝑥
 
For the situation after the merger, it is the distribution of 𝑣𝑀 = max[𝑣11, 𝑣21] +max[𝑥12, 𝑥22] conditional on (𝑣11, 𝑣12) that determines the expected surplus of the merged 
entity. That is, we have to evaluate 
𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) ≡ Pr[max[𝑣11, 𝑣21] + max[𝑣12, 𝑣22] ≤ 𝑥 |𝑣11, 𝑣12]. 
In the Appendix, we show the derivations of 𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) for the different cases we have to 
consider.  Then, we compute the expected surplus 𝑠𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12) of the merged bidder 
conditional on the private information (𝑣11, 𝑣12) of bidder 𝑖 = 1.  The willingness to merge 
𝑊𝑇𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12) is then defined as follows: 
𝑊𝑇𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12) ≡ 𝑠𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12) − 𝑠1+2������(𝑣11 + 𝑣12). 
Thus, 𝑊𝑇𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12) is the expected gain in surplus due to the merger from the perspective of 
a bidder of type (𝑣11, 𝑣12).  Figure 4 shows the graphs of 𝑊𝑇𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12) as a function of 𝑣11, for 
11 different values of 𝑣12, 𝑣12 ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, … ,0.45, 0.5 }. 
We conclude that (as in the single-aspect case analyzed in the previous section) all types 
have an incentive to merge.  The graph clearly shows that almost symmetric types that are 
close to (𝑣11, 𝑣12) = (0,0) and (1,1) have the lowest incentives to merge, while asymmetric 
types that are close to �0, 1
2
� and �0, 1
2
� have the largest incentives to merge.  This is, of 
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course, not so surprising.  Asymmetric types have the highest chance of positively 
contributing to the valuation of the merged firm (due to a very high value on one aspect), 
while also benefitting from the fact that the chances are high that the other merging firm also 
positively contributes (due to a very low value on the other aspect). 
One final remark about this two-aspect valuation model is that the merging bidders 
significantly benefit from the merger.  The joint ex ante expected surplus of both merging 
bidders, i.e., before they know their types, increases from 0.0371 to 0.0485, while the surplus 
of the non-merging bidders slightly decreases.  This implies that the two-aspect model 
overcomes the free riding issue in mergers. 
 
Figure 4. Willingness to merge 𝑊𝑇𝑀(𝑣11, 𝑣12), as a function of 𝑣11 (horizontal axis) for 
different values of 𝑣12 (different graphs), for 𝑁 = 4. 
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4. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed symmetric and asymmetric sealed-bid auctions to study the 
impact of mergers in bidding markets on equilibrium bidding functions and expected revenue.  
We have also asked the question whether firms have an incentive to merge given the private 
information they have.  The study of the incentives to merge in a private information context 
is, as far as we know, new to the literature on mergers. 
In case the valuation of the merged entity is the maximum of the valuation of the 
merging entities, we confirm the standard economic intuition regarding mergers in “normal” 
markets: mergers make the auction less competitive measured by lower expected revenue for 
the auctioneer.  We also show that bidders have an incentive to merge, no matter how small or 
large their valuation.  Thus, there is no merger paradox.  Nevertheless, there is a free-riding 
problem in the sense that everybody wants others to merge. 
In many markets, however, the valuation of a bidder is composed of several aspects (such 
as marketing, organizational, production, etc.) and a merged entity may be able to select the 
best aspects of each of the merging bidders to create the overall value of the newly merged 
bidder.  With two aspects, we show that the results of the single-aspect model summarized in 
the previous paragraph are overturned.  In particular, bidding markets may become more 
competitive and expected revenue may increase after a merger.  Still, because of the increase 
in expected value due to the merger, bidders of all types do have an incentive to merge.  
Moreover, the free riding issue is absent in the two-aspect model; the merging bidders benefit 
from the merger whereas non-merging bidders suffer from it. 
One interesting issue is whether two-aspect mergers should be regarded as generating a 
synergy between the merged parties.  One may argue that the two-aspect model assumes 
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synergies as in expected terms the value of the merged entity is higher than the maximum of 
the valuations of the two merging firms.4
There are, however, two arguments that shed at least some doubt on this view.  First, 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990, p. 112) argue that when the only thing that a merged firm can do 
after the merger is to “better allocate outputs across facilities” then the merger is said to 
generate no synergies.  They call this process a rationalization of production possibilities.  In 
the spirit of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), one could argue that the two-aspect model only 
allows the firm to re-allocate resources over production facilities, and, therefore, it does not 
generate synergies.  Second, one interesting feature of the two-aspect model in our private 
information setting is that firms do not know in advance whether they will merge with a firm 
that has a comparative advantage in one of the relevant aspects.  That is, even if one 
acknowledges that there is a feature of synergies present in the two-aspect model, the firms do 
not know about this before the merger materializes. 
 
A potential drawback of the present analysis is that there are only few analytical results 
that can be derived.  The numerical analysis, on the other hand, depends on the specific 
distributions of valuations one starts out with, and on the number of firms considered.  The 
uniform distributions we have considered, however, are not prone to the critic that the 
analysis depends on skewness of the distributions, with many high or low types.  We also 
considered small number of firms to start with, in order to focus on bidding markets where 
mergers potentially have large effects.  One potential interesting issue for further research is 
to analyze situations where the proposal or the acceptance to merge provides information 
(signals) about the type of a firm.  This can be achieved in the current set-up by introducing a 
cost of a merger that is such that some types of firms find the merger beneficial whereas other 
types do not have an incentive to merge.  This signaling aspect affects the beliefs of merging 
and non-merging firms, as well as the beliefs of competition authorities concerning the types 
                                                                        
4  In terms of the traditional merger analysis, this means that the (expected) cost function of the 
merged entity is below the cost function of each of the merging firms. 
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of firms that do effectively merge.  It would be interesting to see how the results concerning 
bidding function and revenue are affected by such signaling motives. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.  For 𝑁 = 2𝑘, the revenue before the merger is denoted by 𝑅(2𝑘).  
As the auction is symmetric, the revenue equivalence holds.  Thus, 𝑅(2𝑘) is the expectation 
of the second highest-order statistics amongst 2𝑘 random variables with density 𝑓(𝑥) from 
section 3: 
𝑅(2𝑘) = �𝑥 ∙ 2𝑘(2𝑘 − 1)�𝐹(𝑥)�2𝑘−2�1 − 𝐹(𝑥)�𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥1
0
. 
For 𝑘 = 2 we have: 
𝑅(4) = 12�𝑥�𝐹(𝑥)�2�1 − 𝐹(𝑥)�𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥1
0
 
= 12
⎝
⎛16�𝑥6(1 − 2𝑥2)𝑑𝑥12
0
+ 8�𝑥(1 − 2(1 − 𝑥)2)2(1 − 𝑥)3𝑑𝑥1
1
2 ⎠
⎞ = 9471680 
Let now bidders 𝑖 = 1,2 merge.  Then, we define 𝑣𝑀,1 ≡ max[𝑣11, 𝑣21] and 𝑣𝑀,2 ≡max[𝑣12, 𝑣22].  Components 𝑣𝑀,1 and 𝑣𝑀,2 follow distributions: 
𝐹𝑀,1(𝑥) ≡ Pr[𝑣𝑀,1 ≤ 𝑥] = 4𝑥2,   𝐹𝑀,2 = Pr[𝑣𝑀,2 ≤ 𝑥] = 4𝑥2 
with the densities: 
𝑓𝑀,1(𝑥) = 𝑓𝑀,2(𝑥) = 8𝑥. 
The value 𝑣𝑀 = 𝑣𝑀,1 + 𝑣𝑀,2 of the merged entity is distributed according to the following 
density: 
𝑓𝑀(𝑥) = � 𝑓𝑀,1(𝑥 − 𝑡)𝑓𝑀,2(𝑡)𝑑𝑡∞
−∞
= 8� 𝑓1(𝑥 − 𝑡) ∙ 𝑡𝑑𝑡0.5
0
= 8 � 𝑓1(𝑧) ∙ (𝑥 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥
𝑥−0.5  
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= �323 𝑥3                                                                 , if  𝑥 ∈ �0, 12�163 �2(1 − 𝑥)3 − 6(1 − 𝑥)2 + 3(1 − 𝑥)�, if  𝑥 ∈ �12 , 1�  
The distribution function can be found by integrating 𝑓𝑀(𝑥): 
𝐹𝑀(𝑥) = �83 𝑥4                                                                       , if  𝑥 ∈ �0, 12�1 − 83 ((1 − 𝑥)4 − 4(1 − 𝑥)3 + 3(1 − 𝑥)2), if  𝑥 ∈ �12 , 1�  
If all bidders form pairs, the resulting auction has 𝑁 = 𝑘 bidders (instead of 𝑁 = 2𝑘) whose 
values are distributed according to 𝐹𝑀(𝑥) instead of 𝐹(𝑥).  The auction is again symmetric 
and revenue equivalence holds.  Thus, 𝑅𝑀(𝑘) is the expectation of the second highest-order 
statistics amongst 𝑘 random variables with density 𝑓𝑀(𝑥): 
𝑅𝑀(𝑘) = �𝑥 ∙ 𝑘(𝑘 − 1)(𝐹𝑀)𝑘−2(1 − 𝐹𝑀)𝑓𝑀𝑑𝑥1
0
. 
Computing for 𝑘 = 2 and using the notation 𝑡 = (1 − 𝑥), we get: 
𝑅𝑀(2) = 2�𝑥(1 − 𝐹𝑀)𝑓𝑀𝑑𝑥1
0
= 643 ��1 − 83 𝑥4� 𝑥4𝑑𝑥
1
2
0
+ 
+ 2569 �𝑥(𝑡4 − 4𝑡3 + 3𝑡2)(2𝑡3 − 6𝑡2 + 3𝑡)𝑑𝑥1
1
2
= 16222835. 
Thus, the revenue increase, when two pairs sequentially merge, is: 
𝑅𝑀(2) − 𝑅(4) = 16222835 − 9471680 = 38345360 > 0. 
The fact that 𝑅𝑀(2) − 𝑅(4) > 0 implies that either the merger from 𝑁 = 4 to 𝑁 = 3 firms or 
the merger from 𝑁 = 3 to 𝑁 = 2 firms must increase profits. Q.E.D. 
Expressions for 𝑭𝑴�𝒙|𝒗𝟏𝟏,𝒗𝟏𝟐�. 
One of the important ingredients in the analysis of the incentives to merge is the distribution 
function of the value of the merged firm 𝑣𝑀 = max[𝑣11, 𝑣21] + max[𝑥12, 𝑥22] conditional on the 
 21 
two aspects (𝑣11, 𝑣12) of the valuations of one of the merging bidder 𝑖 = 1, i.e., 𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12).  
Obviously, 𝐹𝑀 = 0 when 𝑣11 + 𝑣12 < 𝑥.  Then, 𝐹𝑀 has a mass point at 𝑥 = 𝑣11 + 𝑣12: 
𝐹𝑀(𝑣11 + 𝑣12|𝑣11, 𝑣12) ≜ Pr[𝑣𝑀 ≤ 𝑣11 + 𝑣12|𝑣11, 𝑣12] = Pr[𝑣21 ≤ 𝑣11, 𝑣22 ≤ 𝑣12|𝑣11, 𝑣12] = 𝑣11𝑣12. 
Suppose that 𝑥 > 𝑣11 + 𝑣12.  Then 𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) ≜ Pr[𝑣𝑀 ≤ 𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12] is: 
𝐹𝑀 = Pr[𝑣𝑀 ≤ 𝑥 ∶ 𝑣21 > 𝑣11, 𝑣22 < 𝑣12] + Pr[𝑣𝑀 ≤ 𝑥 ∶ 𝑣21 < 𝑣11, 𝑣22 > 𝑣12]+ Pr[𝑣𝑀 ≤ 𝑥 ∶ 𝑣21 > 𝑣11, 𝑣22 > 𝑣12] + Pr[𝑣𝑀 ≤ 𝑥 ∶ 𝑣21 < 𝑣11, 𝑣22 < 𝑣12] = Pr[𝑣21 ≤ 𝑥 − 𝑣12 ∶ 𝑣21 > 𝑣11, 𝑣22 < 𝑣12] + Pr[𝑣22 ≤ 𝑥 − 𝑣11 ∶ 𝑣21 < 𝑣11, 𝑣22 > 𝑣12] + Pr[𝑣21 + 𝑣22 ≤ 𝑥 ∶ 𝑣21 > 𝑣11, 𝑣22 > 𝑣12] + Pr[𝑣11 + 𝑣12 ≤ 𝑥 ∶ 𝑣21 < 𝑣11, 𝑣22 < 𝑣12] 
= 4�(𝑥 − 𝑣12 − 𝑣11)𝑣12 + (𝑥 − 𝑣11 − 𝑣12)𝑣11 + 𝑣11𝑣12� + � � � 𝑑𝐹(𝑣22)𝑥−𝑣21
𝑣1
2
�𝑑𝐹(𝑣21)0.5
𝑣1
1
. 
Considering four cases depending on relations between 𝑥, 𝑣11, and 𝑣12 yields: 
• Case 𝑥 − 𝑣11 ≤ 0.5, 𝑥 − 𝑣12 ≤ 0.5: 
𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) = 4 ��𝑥 − (𝑣11 + 𝑣12)�(𝑣11 + 𝑣12) + 𝑣11𝑣12� + 2�𝑥 − (𝑣11 + 𝑣12)�2 = 2(𝑥2 − (𝑣11 + 𝑣12)2 + 2𝑣11𝑣12) = 2(𝑥2 − (𝑣11)2 − (𝑣12)2). 
• Case 𝑥 − 𝑣11 ≤ 0.5, 𝑥 − 𝑣12 ≥ 0.5: 
𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) = 2�𝑥2 − �𝑥 − 12�2 − (𝑣11)2� = 2𝑥 − 12 − 2(𝑣11)2. 
• Case 𝑥 − 𝑣11 ≥ 0.5, 𝑥 − 𝑣12 ≤ 0.5: 
𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) = 2�𝑥2 − �𝑥 − 12�2 − (𝑣12)2� = 2𝑥 − 12 − 2(𝑣12)2. 
• Case 𝑥 − 𝑣11 ≥ 0.5, 𝑥 − 𝑣12 ≥ 0.5: 
𝐹𝑀(𝑥|𝑣11, 𝑣12) = 2 �𝑥2 − 2 �𝑥 − 12�2� = 4𝑥 − 2𝑥2 − 1 = 1 − 2(1 − 𝑥)2. 
This ends the description of all relevant cases. 
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